A Welfare-Centered Legal Framework for Animals Is Possible: The Swiss Example

In debates on animal rights, the issue is often reduced to whether physical violence has been inflicted on an animal or whether the animal’s life has been ended. Yet contemporary animal welfare law approaches the matter from a broader perspective. It considers not only whether an animal survives, but also whether it lives in a manner appropriate to its species, whether its social needs are met, whether it is kept free from unnecessary fear and stress, whether it has access to movement, and whether it is condemned to loneliness as a result of arbitrary human preferences.

From this perspective, Swiss regulation offers a highly instructive example. The Swiss Animal Welfare Act protects not only the physical integrity of animals, but also their welfare and dignity. The Swiss Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office clearly states that, in cases of serious violations, a person may be prohibited from keeping animals, breeding them, working commercially with animals, or trading in animals.

The key concept here is the “dignity of the animal.” This may at first appear to be an abstract appeal to conscience; however, in Swiss law it produces very concrete legal consequences. Animals are expected to be treated with regard to their species-specific characteristics, not reshaped according to human expectations, and handled with respect even within contexts of sport, exhibition, trade, or ownership. Swiss authorities particularly emphasize that animals should be able to live as species-appropriate a life as possible.

One of the strongest reflections of this approach can be seen in the rules concerning the solitary keeping of social animals. Article 13 of the Swiss Animal Welfare Ordinance provides that animals belonging to species that live in groups must be given sufficient opportunity for social interaction with members of their own species. This provision points to a legal understanding that does not read animal welfare merely through food, water, and shelter, but also treats loneliness as a welfare issue.

This point must be framed correctly: we are not speaking of a crude and general rule in Switzerland that “every animal must be adopted in pairs.” We are speaking of a more nuanced and legally stronger principle: social species must be kept in a way that allows sufficient contact with animals of their own kind. In other words, whether an animal may be kept alone is assessed according to the biological and behavioral needs of that species. This is precisely where the law focuses.

The regulation concerning dogs is particularly noteworthy. Under Article 70 of the Swiss Animal Welfare Ordinance, dogs must have sufficient daily contact with humans and, as far as possible, contact with other dogs. Dogs kept in boxes or kennels for more than three months must be able to see, hear, and smell another dog in a neighboring enclosure. However, if a dog has at least five hours of contact per day with humans or other dogs outside its enclosure, this requirement is assessed differently.

This regulation treats the dog not merely as a pet belonging to its owner, but as a living being with social needs. A dog being constantly kept in a garden, kennel, on a chain, or in an enclosed space is not considered legally sufficient merely because it is “not starving.” Article 71 of the same Ordinance also requires dogs to be taken outdoors every day in a manner appropriate to their needs, to be allowed to move off leash where possible, and makes clear that time spent in a kennel or on a chain does not count as access to open space.

A similar welfare logic is established with respect to cats. Under Article 80 of the Ordinance, cats kept alone must have daily contact with humans or visual contact with animals of their own species. Keeping cats in individual cages is limited to a maximum of three weeks; even in such cases, they must be given the opportunity to move outside the cage on at least five days per week.

This provision corresponds to a highly important principle in practice: the independent character of cats cannot be used as a justification for ignoring their social and environmental needs. Providing a cat with food and water alone is not considered a sufficient standard; contact, movement, visual stimulation, and a suitable living environment are also matters of assessment.

The same principle appears even more clearly in relation to farm and herd animals. The Swiss Animal Welfare Ordinance sets out detailed rules for calves, goats, llamas, alpacas, and equines regarding group living, visual contact, auditory contact, olfactory contact, or group housing up to a certain age. For example, llamas and alpacas must be kept in groups; males kept alone must still be able to have visual contact with animals of their own species. Equines must be able to have visual, auditory, and olfactory contact with another equine.

The same line continues with small domestic animals. The annexes to the Ordinance expressly state that certain species must be kept in groups of at least two animals; even where keeping a single animal is permitted, it is separately noted that this exception does not apply to social species. This reflects the legal logic behind the approach often summarized in public discourse as “it is illegal to keep a single guinea pig in Switzerland.” The issue is not cuteness; it is the recognition that leaving a social species alone constitutes a welfare violation.

In the Swiss system, adoption and sale are also not treated as ordinary transactions of purchase and sale. Article 111 of the Animal Welfare Ordinance imposes an obligation on persons who commercially sell domestic or wild animals to provide buyers with written information about the animal’s needs, proper care, appropriate housing, and the relevant legal requirements. Those who sell animal housing systems are likewise required to provide written information about housing conditions appropriate to the needs of the species.

The importance of this regulation lies here: under Swiss law, taking an animal into one’s home is not viewed merely as an emotional decision. Bringing a living being into one’s life is treated as a legal and ethical responsibility requiring knowledge, time, financial capacity, a suitable environment, and continuity. Love is valuable; however, the law does not accept love alone as a sufficient safeguard. It places knowledge, oversight, and sanctions alongside it.

In my view, this is where the real value of the Swiss approach lies. It does not leave animal welfare to the conscience of well-intentioned individuals; it ties it to concrete rules, supervision, and sanctions. The animal’s loneliness, access to movement, social contact, housing conditions, information provided at the point of sale, and the owner’s competence are all evaluated within the same system.

This approach sees the animal not merely as a being to be protected, but as a living creature with a need to live in a manner appropriate to its species. Legally, this marks an important threshold. If animal welfare is limited solely to a prohibition on “causing suffering,” many violations become invisible. Yet condemning a social animal to loneliness, ignoring its need for movement, or confining it to an unsuitable living space must also be treated as welfare violations.

In Turkey, the debate today is focused more heavily on stray animals, the obligations of municipalities, shelters, and public safety. Law No. 7527 and the amendments it introduced to Law No. 5199 on the Protection of Animals brought new provisions on issues such as the definition of stray animals, the definition of owned animals, the registration of animals admitted to shelters, and the keeping of rehabilitated dogs in shelters until they are adopted.

However, the essential issue to be discussed here is not so much the technical headings of the regulation, but the legal philosophy with which it is implemented. Viewing stray animals merely as an administrative problem, a municipal burden, or a public safety issue weakens the spirit of animal welfare law. In the face of the most defenseless living beings, the law must stand not only as an instrument of order, but also as a guardian of life. If the right to life is accepted as one of the most fundamental values of human conscience and the legal order, then this value must also be treated, at least in relation to animals, as a legal principle worthy of protection. For this reason, when new regulations are implemented, the guiding principle should not be “the easiest administrative solution,” but rather “the solution that protects life the most and minimizes suffering.” Policies of collection, confinement, or indefinite sheltering until adoption, unless supported by transparent oversight, sufficient capacity, veterinary control, sterilization, and genuine adoption mechanisms, may create new legal and moral problems instead of strengthening animal welfare. The law must not lose its sense of compassion while managing society’s fears; it must not turn its back on the sanctity of life while protecting public order.

The issue of stray animals must, of course, be solved. But if that solution is built solely on a reflex of collecting, confining, or rendering animals invisible, it will remain inadequate from the perspective of animal welfare. The law must stand on a line that takes account of the right to life, proportionality, administrative transparency, and public conscience together. Sterilization, registration, adoption, oversight of breeding and sales, sanctions for abandonment, shelter standards, and the social and welfare needs of animals must be addressed simultaneously.

In this respect, the Swiss example offers a strong direction: protecting animals must not be limited to merely refraining from harming them. They must also be protected against loneliness, social deprivation, poor housing, uninformed ownership, and commercial arbitrariness.

True animal welfare law begins precisely here: it does not settle for asking whether an animal is alive; it also asks how that animal lives.